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CURBING THE MEDIA:
SHOULD REPORTERS PAY WHEN POLICE
RIDE-ALONGS VIOLATE PRIVACY?
I. INTRODUCTION
When Warren and Brandeis meditated on "the right to be let alone"
in 1890,1 so-called reality-based television shows were still a century
away. But the justices eerily foretold the impact of such programs,
which typically involve law enforcement agents shadowed by video
crews as they serve warrants, make arrests, and interrogate suspects!
The authors, in explaining how the harm caused by certain invasions
of privacy extends beyond the individual to society, wrote:
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed
of more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a
lowering of social standards and of morality .... When personal
gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available
for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that
the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance ....
Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of
feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can
survive, under its blighting influence.4
The frequent breaking down of doors in shows such as Cops5 also
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).
2. However, the forerunner of such shows, Allen Funt's Candid Camera, appeared less
than 60 years later. Associated Press, Fun-Loving Candid Camera Creator Was Pioneer in
Reality TV, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 7, 1999, at B10 (reporting on Funt's death).
Funt, who introduced his show in 1949, is credited with creating "what has become an entire
programming genre." Id. (quoting Michael Naidus, spokesman for the Columbia
Broadcasting System television network).
3. Cops Staying on the Beat, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 15, 1998, at E9, available at
1998 WL 4003578 (announcing Fox Television's renewal of the reality-based show Cops for
an 11th season). The half-hour show "visits different cities to follow real-life cops as they go
about their rounds." Id.
4. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
5. Benjamin Smith, Spotlight to Shine Again on IPD, IND. STAR, June 20, 1999, at B3,
available at 1999 WL 3851329 (detailing how the Indianapolis Police Department hoped to
"clean up its national image" by letting Cops film its officers). The story, attributing its
information to the show's producer, notes, "Remember, this is entertainment. Cops tries to
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serves to break down the traditional partition between news ("matters
of real interest to the community")6 and entertainment. As the
spectacle of police bursting into a stranger's home becomes just another
of television's visual clich6s,7 viewers-including other law enforcement
officers-seem to become indifferent to underlying questions about its
appropriateness,' or how it would feel to have police and television
cameras storm their own homes for the sake of entertainment.
Those still capable of "robustness of thought"9 have been horrified,
so much so that even non-entertainment-driven "ride-alongs"' become
suspect." What had once been considered a legitimate newsgathering
focus on the silly, funny and plain dumb." Id.
6. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
7. See Gary Williams, The Right of Privacy Versus the Right to Know: The War
Continues, 19 LOY. L. A. ENT. L. J. 215, 217 (1999). The article notes:
The growing popularity of the tabloid press, and the adaptation of its methodology
to television, have increased the demand for "inside" information about our stars,
our politicians, our heroes, our victims, and our villains. The explosion of "reality
programming" with its insatiable appetite for visual and aural images of exciting,
bizarre, and tragic human occurrences threatens to intrude on the privacy of
ordinary citizens.
Id. See also Joanne Trestrail, Reality Theater: Where Real Live is Real Life, CHI. TRIB., May
2, 1999, at 2, available at 1999 WL 2869481 (describing the "tawdry pleasures" of shows such
as Cops in discussing the allure of real-life drama). "All of the reality shows are windows into
neighborhoods, subcultures and emotional landscapes previously overlooked by TV." Id.
See also Joanne Weintrab, Live, from TV: It's... Reality, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 22,
2000, at Al (linking the popularity of game and reality-based shows to "the allure of
spontaneity, the suggestion that something wonderful, terrible or bizarre might happen at any
moment").
8. Police officers in Los Angeles, for example, recently allowed a television show to
videotape their discovery of "the body of a drug overdose victim" and subsequent phone call
to the victim's parents. The parents sued the show's producer and syndication company. In
the News, Television Program LAPD: Life on the Beat May Have Invaded Privacy of Parents
of Drug Overdose Victim, California Appellate Court Rules; Videotape Showed Police Officer
Informing Parents By Phone of Their Son's Death and Included Parents' Unintelligible
Responses, ENT. L. REP. Nov. 1999, at 25 (reporting on Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal.
App. 4th 299 (1999)).
9. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
10. James C. Goodale, Ride-Along Into the Sunset, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 15, 1998, at 3
(discussing how recent cases "cast doubt on this journalistic custom and practice"). "Ride-
along works this way: The authorities obtain a search warrant and notify the press to ride
along with them. The cops love it because subsequent publicity aids their crime-busting
activities." Id.
11. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 685 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding district court decision
that a CBS video crew "seized" the image of those whose home was searched for narcotics,
making the search illegal), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1062 (1995). The court noted that, "A
private home is not a soundstage for law enforcement theatricals." Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
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technique, l2 protected by the First Amendment,13 instead is seen as an
attempt to "magnify needlessly" the privacy invasion authorized by a
search warrant.
14
Thus the stage was set for the U.S. Supreme Court's May 24, 1999
decision in Wilson v. Layne that law enforcement officials violate the
Fourth Amendment by inviting the media on ride-alongs to private
homes.5 The Court specifically noted that:
We hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for
police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a
home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the
third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the
warrant.
However, because the Fourth Amendment' right in question had
not been clearly established at the time of the Wilson incident, the Court
found that the officers being sued should be able to claim qualified
immunity."
12. Goodale, supra note 10, at 3. "For decades, years, maybe even centuries, reporters
have 'ridden along' with federal agents as they searched private places for criminal activity.
Some of the best icons of the 1920s, for example, are photos of narcotic agents breaking
expensive bottles of champagne at '21.' Id See also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616
(1999) (citing Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 919 (Fla. 1976) (stating "'it is a
widespread practice of long-standing"' for media to accompany officers into homes")).
13. Warren Richey, When Cops Bust In, News Crews in Tow, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, March 24, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 537800 (noting media and federal
agents urged the Wilson court to "strike a balance on a case-by-case basis, keeping in mind
the First Amendment's right to know").
14. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
15. 526 U.S. at 604.
16. Id. at 614. The Court earlier noted: "It may well be that media ride-alongs further
the law enforcement objectives of the police in a general sense, but that is not the same as
furthering the purpose of the search." Id at 612.
17. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615. The Court also said in Wilson:
Between the time of the events of this case and today's decision, a split among the
Federal Circuits in fact developed on the question whether media ride-alongs that
2000]
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The Court failed to address other questions surrounding the ride-
along issue, such as whether the ban should extend to police activities
outside of private homes.'9  Such activities include safety-check
roadblocks, of which police often notify the media in advance, 20 as well
as ride-alongs to street-corner drug busts or raids on public
establishments.'
Even more conspicuous by its absence was any reference to whether
the media itself violates the Fourth Amendment during ride-alongs by
virtue of police-media cooperation that rises to the level of state action.
The issue did not arise in Wilson, because the citizens involved sued
only the officers responsible and not the media outlet.'
But it has factored into a case stemming from CNN's taping of a raid
by federal marshals on a Montana couple's ranch.' The Court, based on
Wilson, found that federal marshals had violated the ranchers' Fourth
Amendment rights but the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.4
Yet, it refused to hear an appeal from CNN over a Ninth Circuit ruling
enter homes subject the police to money damages. If judges thus disagree on a
constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking
the losing side of the controversy.
Id. at 618. (citations omitted). See also infra Part III.
19. "But what about the less dramatic news gathering by beat reporters and investigators
from both print and electronic outlets?" Richard M. Knoth, Tuning Out Blue News: Court's
Rejection of Police-Media Ride-Alongs Will Hinder Legitimate Reporting, LEGAL TIMES, July
12, 1999, at S27 (questioning whether the Wilson decision will "quash the media's legitimate
role of oversight").
20. Tipping off reporters to such police operations is common because departments have
a "vested interest in promoting their public image; consequently they are often selective in
what they report to the media." Thus the activities often are those that "demonstrate a social
need for their services." David E. Bond, Note, Police Liability for the Media "Ride-Along,"
77 B. U. L. REv. 825, 826-27 n.7 (1997) (quoting W. Clinton Terry, Crime and the News:
Gatekeeping and Beyond, in JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA 41-42 (Ray Surette ed., 1984)). See
also Alan Vinegard, Law Enforcement and the Media: Cooperative Co-Existence, 1999 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 237, 243 (2000) (noting the police community "is oftentimes amenable... to
publiciz[ing] its exploits or otherwise draw[ing] attention to some investigative or
prosecutorial effort it has undertaken"). But see Henry R. Rossbacher et al., An Invasion of
Privacy: The Media's Involvement in Law Enforcement Activities, 19 LOY. L. A. ENT. L. J.
313, 335 (1999) (describing media-police cooperation as mainly resulting in "prosecutions
motivated by publicity, not the public interest").
21. Linda Greenhouse, Police Violate Privacy in Home Raids with Journalists, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1999, at A25. See also Goodale, supra note 10, at 3.
22. The Washington Post had a reporter and photographer present but never published
photos taken at the home. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608.
23. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.
1999) (affirming the district court's decision in part, reversing in part, and remanding in part,
due to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)).
24. Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 808.
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exposing the cable news network to liability for invading the ranchers'
privacy.2'
The court of appeals had reversed a grant of summary judgment to
CNN on the ranchers' claims, based on its conclusion that the media
participated as "joint actors" with the law enforcement officers.26 In the
wake of the Supreme Court's ride-along decision, the media aspect of
the case has been remanded to federal district court in Montana for
further proceedings.27
This Comment examines the scope of the Court's ride-along opinion
and its impact on newsgathering, and asserts that the Ninth Circuit's
opinion on what elevates media cooperation in a police activity to the
level of state action is fact-specific and so cannot be universally applied.
This Comment further calls for courts facing questions over media-
police cooperation to focus on what is "highly offensive" '" in balancing
society's dual interests in protecting privacy and staying informed.
Specifically, Part II outlines the conflict between traditional privacy
interests and the public's right to know about events and issues of social
significance. It also examines the evolving judicial interpretation of
what the First Amendment really protects when it comes to freedom of
the press. Part III explains the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in
Wilson as to why police violate the Fourth Amendment by taking
reporters into private homes to witness searches and arrests, as well as
why the officers involved in the Wilson case deserved qualified
immunity anyway. It further discusses when non-police defendants
should be able to claim a "good faith" defense to such suits, even
without qualified immunity.
Part IV looks at the Wilson companion case, Hanlon v. Berger,29 in
which the Supreme Court again granted qualified immunity to the
officers involved but denied certiorari on the issue of whether CNN
could be held liable for its role. It also more closely examines the joint
actor doctrine invoked by the Ninth Circuit to hold the media
accountable. Part V, meanwhile, assesses the impact on news coverage
of both Wilson and the Ninth Circuit's assertion in Berger that news
outlets may be held liable for Fourth Amendment violations if it is
determined the media organization became a state actor. It further
25. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Berger, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999).
26. Berger, 129 F.3d at 516.
27. Berger, 188 F.3d at 1155 (affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding in part).
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
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argues that the Ninth Circuit's Berger reasoning should not extend to all
cases involving media-police cooperation, because it is based on an
extraordinary factual situation and the joint actor doctrine is not
intended to be invoked in lesser circumstances.
II. PRIVATE V. PUBLIC INTERESTS
A. The Concept of Privacy
The oft-quoted article by Warren and Brandeis on privacy has led
many jurisdictions over the years to recognize a common law right to
privacy, the idea that, "[o]ne has a public persona, exposed and active,
and a private persona, guarded and preserved. The heart of our liberty
is choosing which parts of our lives shall become public and which parts
we shall hold close., 30
The four traditional invasion of privacy torts are for intrusion upon
seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, publication of private facts,
and false light publicity.3 The test for each tort is whether a reasonable
person would find the invasion to be highly offensive.32 For example,
intrusion upon seclusion is when one "intentionally intrudes, physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns" and the test is whether "the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.""
The second privacy tort, meanwhile, protects individuals from
having their identities appropriated for the use or benefit of another.1
The third refers to giving "publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another" in cases where the information revealed would be
"highly offensive to a reasonable person" and not of legitimate interest
to the public.35 The fourth privacy tort covers situations in which one
publicizes "a matter concerning another that places the other before the
public in a false light."36 That false light must be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and the actor must have had "knowledge of or acted
30. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). Only two states
have yet to recognize any of the four torts for invasion of privacy (although two others
rejected "a common law basis for the right to privacy and instead provide statutory
protection"). Id. at 234-35.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 652(B).
34. Id. § 652(C).
35. Id. § 652(D).
36. Id. § 652(E).
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in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the other would be placed."37
Although codified by statutes in only a few states, in recent years
courts have increasingly adopted these invasion of privacy torts so that
now only two states fail to recognize any of these torts." A third state,
Minnesota, only recently acknowledged the common law right to
privacy-but its supreme court recognized just three of the four actions
in tort.3
9
Debate continues, however, on where to draw the lines for each tort
and on their relation to other torts, such as trespass. Yet it is well-
established that one area protected by the common law right to privacy
is the home.r In issuing its ban on media ride-alongs to private
residences, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the sanctity of the home
has been recognized at least as far back as 1604."' And as William
Blackstone noted in the 1760s:
[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the
immunity of a man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will
never suffer it to be violated with impunity: agreeing herein with
the sentiments of ancient Rome .... For this reason no doors
can in general be broken open to execute any civil process;
though, in criminal causes, the public safety supersedes the
private.42
Courts today draw the line at the castle door even in cases involving
the media.4 ' For example, in Dietemann v. Time, the Ninth Circuit
37. Id.
38. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, 582 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 1998) (identifying North
Dakota and Wyoming as the holdouts and noting that Georgia was the first state to recognize
the common law right to privacy).
39. See id. at 235 (recognizing the torts of intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and
publication of private facts, but rejecting the tort of false light publicity because the court
feared such claims would be too similar to claims under defamation).
40. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,610 (1999).
41. Id. at 609.
42. Id. at 610 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 223 (1765-1769)).
43. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (ruling against magazine
whose employees helped police while gaining entrance to man's home for a story); see also
Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding intrusion into privacy when
television crew followed paramedics into woman's bedroom). But see Deteresa v. ABC, 121
F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no intrusion when media surreptitiously taped woman in
front of her home).
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found that Life Magazine invaded the privacy of a California man when
it cooperated with Los Angeles County's district attorney to investigate
whether the self-described "healer" was practicing medicine without a
license.44
A.A. Dietemann, a plumber, let a reporter and photographer into
his home because they said a third person referred them for his services
as a healer.45 Once inside, the two photographed Dietemann with a
hidden camera and transmitted his conversation outside to a car
occupied by another Life employee, a representative for the district
attorney, and a public health official.46 The court, basing its decision on
California law, rejected Life's argument that it was not liable because its
employees were gathering news and thus protected by the First
Amendment.4 7
Yet each new invasion of privacy case involving the media must
balance the individual's privacy against the First Amendment
protections usually extended to news publishers and broadcasters,
because of the public service involved in publicizing news.
B. The Public's Right to Know
The media defends its right to gather news on the grounds of "the
public's right to know." Yet, the profession is sensitive to the balance
required, as industry literature on ethics attests:
There are few greater conflicts than the need for free
information flow versus the rights of individuals to personal
privacy. The public has a need for much information that others,
for a variety of motives, would like to keep private .... Harm
from privacy invasion is almost certain, but it is more difficult for
a journalist to fully identify benefits from an intrusion. Thus, it is
important to recognize that the primary ethical obligation of
journalism is to inform the public by seeking truth and reporting
it as fully as possible. That obligation must then be balanced
against the obligation to respect individuals and their privacy.'
44. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 246.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 248.
48. JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK WITH CASE
STUDIES 167 (Sigma Delta Chi Foundation and the Society of Professional Journalists 1993).
Journalism textbooks also take pains to warn future reporters to respect the balance: "Today,
more than ever, many readers and viewers are asking the mass media to exercise
[Vol. 84:541
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The "bible" of many daily newspapers, the Stylebook and Libel
Manual produced by The Associated Press, even includes a chapter on
"The Right of Privacy" that tries to guide reporters in their approach to
privacy issues.49 It states in part:
When a person becomes involved in a news event, voluntarily or
involuntarily, he forfeits the right to privacy. Similarly, a person
somehow involved in a matter of legitimate public interest, even
if not a bona fide spot news event, normally can be written about
with safety. However, this is different from publication of a story
or picture that dredges up the sordid details of a person's past
and has no current newsworthiness.'
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has made it clear that even if an
individual meets the requirements of a public figure, a media outlet still
can be liable for invasion of privacy if a story contains "knowing or
reckless falsehood."' But it also makes allowances for non-malicious
errors. In the 1967 case that applied First Amendment considerations to
privacy issues, the Supreme Court wrote:
"The line between the informing and the entertaining is too
elusive for the protection of... [freedom of the press]."
Erroneous statement is no less inevitable in such a case than in
the case of comment upon public affairs, and in both, if innocent
or merely negligent... "it must be protected, if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need... to
survive' ... " We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the
indispensable service of a free press in a free society if we saddle
the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty
the facts associated in a news article with a person's name,
picture or portrait, particularly as related to non-defamatory
matter.52
restraint .... Journalists would do well to ponder these requests. Publish and be damned is
still an appropriate response in some situations. But more often a thoughtful journalist will
take a different tack." DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 235 (McGraw Hill 2000).
49. ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL 290 (Norm Goldstein, ed.,
6th trade ed. 1996).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 292 (quoting the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
52. Time, 385 U.S. at 388-89 (citations omitted) (discussing a privacy suit against Life
magazine for its characterization of the new play The Desperate Hours as representing an
incident from the plaintiff's life).
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Yet recently many courts balancing privacy and First Amendment
concerns have placed more emphasis on the rights of individuals. As the
Dietemann court noted:
The First Amendment has never been construed to accord
newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license
to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the
precincts of another's home or office. It does not become such a
license simply because the person subjected to the intrusion is
reasonably suspected of committing a crime."
Such sentiment seems to signal a change from decisions in which
courts upheld the media's First Amendment rights even over the
concerns of individuals. For example, the i964 landmark libel case, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,54 established that public officials cannot
recover damages for stories "related to official duties unless they prove
actual malice. 'M Three years later, the Supreme Court ruled that "the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press are applicable to
invasion-of-privacy cases involving reports of newsworthy matters."
5 6
Courts that have taken a harder line toward the media in recent
cases perceive a distinction between the broad First Amendment
protection of the media's right to publish the news and the narrower
right to gather the news. As the Dietemann court noted, "[p]rivilege
concepts developed in defamation cases and to some extent in privacy
actions in which publication is an essential component are not relevant
in determining liability for intrusive conduct antedating publication."'57
But the court also found that, "[n]o interest protected by the First
Amendment is adversely affected by permitting damages for intrusion
to be enhanced by the fact of later publication."58
More recently, the California Supreme Court distinguished between
a documentary film crew's right to cover an accident scene and the
53. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,249 (9th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 49, at 285. Although the Supreme Court later
extended the rule to public figures in 1967, the definition of who is a public figure has
narrowed in the ensuing years. See id. at 285-87.
56. Id. at 291 (commenting on Time, 385 U.S. at 374).
57. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249-250.
58. Id. at 250.
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unreasonableness of continuing to film an accident victim who was being
transported to a hospital."
The 1990 car accident that injured Ruth Shulman and her son,
Wayne, also pinned them in an overturned car.6 A camera operator
riding along with the rescue helicopter crew called to the scene filmed
efforts to free the Shulmans; footage was used for a segment of On
Scene: Emergency Response, a documentary-style local television
program.6  The material included audio obtained via a wireless
microphone worn by a nurse on the helicopter crew.
62
Ruth and Wayne Shulman sued Group W Productions for invasion
of privacy, alleging publication of private facts and intrusion.63
California's highest court rejected the claim for publication of private
facts, finding that "the material broadcast was newsworthy as a matter
of law and, therefore, cannot be the basis for tort liability under a
private facts claim."6' But the court said the intrusion claim-based on
the Shulmans' "objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
interior of the rescue helicopter" -should be heard by a jury."
The Shulman court also concluded Group W could not argue that its
alleged intrusion was permissible as long as there existed a legitimate
public interest in the information gathered and the conduct itself was
lawful.6 The court concluded that "[t]he constitutional protection
accorded newsgathering, if any, is far narrower than the protection
surrounding the publication of truthful material."67
This distinction between the media's First Amendment right to
publish (or broadcast) and reporters' permissible conduct in gathering
information to publish (or broadcast) is reflected in judicial decisions on
59. Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
60. Ic. at 475.
61. Id. at 474-75.
62. 1& at 475.
63. 1& at 476.
64. Id. at 477.
65. Id. at 490. An earlier California case noted that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652(B) reference to an intrusion "highly offensive to a reasonable person" may be a
jury standard, but a court must make a preliminary finding of "offensiveness" based on "the
degree of intrusion;" the context, conduct, and circumstances of the intrusion; "the intruder's
motives and objectives;" the setting into which the intrusion occurs; and "the expectations of
those whose privacy is invaded." Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679-80 (Ct. App. 1986).
66. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 495-96.
67. Id. at 496. The court also noted, "[n]o constitutional precedent or principle.., gives
a reporter general license to intrude in an objectively offensive manner into private places,
conversations or matters merely because the reporter thinks he or she may thereby find
something that will warrant publication or broadcast." Id. at 497.
2000]
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the appropriateness of media ride-alongs during the execution of search
warrants. For example, a federal district court in New York considering
a Fourth Amendment cause of action against a Secret Service agent and
media outlet found that the broadcaster "had no greater right than that
of a thief to be in the home, to 'capture' the scene of the search on film
and to remove the photographic record .... CBS claims no First
Amendment right to be present. "'
Second Circuit Court of Appeals judges, in affirming the lower
court's refusal to dismiss the suit against the Secret Service agent, noted
that the officer "exceeded well-established principles when he brought
into the Ayeni home persons who were neither authorized by the
warrant to be there nor serving any legitimate law enforcement purpose
by being there. "69 The appeals court thus denied the agent's assertion of
qualified immunity, finding that the Fourth Amendment ban on
unreasonable searches (which includes bringing along the media) was
well-established and that the agent "could not with objective
reasonableness have believed" his conduct was constitutional."
When the Ninth and Fourth Circuits later split on whether qualified
immunity extended to government agents who let reporters join them
during the execution of search warrants, the U.S. Supreme Court chose
to weigh in on the issue of media ride-alongs.71 Its decision ultimately
clarified matters regarding ride-alongs to private homes, but left other
questions unanswered.
III. A BRIGHT LINE IN WILSON V. LAYNE
A. Constitutional Right Violated
Charles and Geraldine Wilson were still in bed the morning of April
16, 1992, when U.S. marshals and county police entered their home with
68. Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F.Supp. 362, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 35 F.3d 680, 685 (2d
Cir. 1994). CBS had settled with the Ayenis by the time the case reached the Second Circuit.
See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 684 n.2.
69. Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
70. Id. See discussion of qualified immunity infra Part III.B.
71. Compare Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding police officers
deserve qualified immunity because at the time of the 1992 search, no court had found that
media presence during the execution of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment), with
Hanlon v. Berger, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding agents who invited media along on a
raid violated the Fourth Amendment and so are not entitled to qualified immunity),
withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) (amending order based on U.S. Supreme Court
decision).
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a search warrant, looking for the Wilsons' son, Dominic.' When he
went to investigate, the partially dressed Charles Wilson found armed
men in street clothes in his living room.73 His wife, still in her
nightgown, arrived to find the men restraining her angry husband on the
floor." Once the officers determined Dominic Wilson was not in the
home, they left.75
Having police enter their home in such a manner might have been
startling enough for the Wilsons, but the fact that the officers had
invited along a reporter and photographer from the Washington Post
made the situation worse.7 The Wilsons sued the officers as individuals
for damages, alleging the officers violated their constitutional rights by
including the media in the execution of the search warrant.n
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Wilsons that the officers
violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and banned police from
inviting reporters or others along during the execution of a warrant
when the presence of third parties is not needed to execute the
warrant.78 The Court noted:
Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police is
simply not enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along
intrusion into a private home. And even the need for accurate
reporting on police issues in general bears no direct relation to
the constitutional justification for the police intrusion into a
home in order to execute a felony arrest warrant.7 9
The Court's work was not finished, however; it next had to decide
whether the right not to have police include the media while serving
72. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 607 (1999). The police action was part of
Operation Gunsmoke, a fugitive apprehension effort carried out by U.S. Marshals and local
police. Dominic Wilson became an Operation Gunsmoke target by violating his parole on
previous felony convictions. IdL at 606-07.
73. Id. at 607.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The reporter and photographer had been invited under the Marshal's Service's
standard ride-along policy. Idl
77. Id at 608. The Wilsons sued the federal officers directly under the Fourth
Amendment (a Bivens suit) and the state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both allow
plaintiffs "to seek money damages from government officials who have violated" their Fourth
Amendment rights. Id at 609.
78. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 604.
79. Id. at 613.
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warrants at private homes had been clearly established' at the time of
the Wilson raid. The Court's answer-that the right was not clearly
established-meant the officers involved could assert the doctrine of
qualified immunity and thus avoid paying any damages to the Wilsons.1
The case thus provides a bright line regarding ride-alongs to private
residences: Officers who let reporters join them in serving warrants
prior to May 1999 are not liable for the constitutional violation, but any
police officer foolish enough to invite the media along in the future will
personally pay for the mistake.
Meanwhile, only days later the Court avoided deciding whether the
media itself should reach for a checkbook in either instance.' But, it
would be premature to assume the Court denied certiorari because it
agreed with the circuit court's analysis that the media involvement had
risen to the level of state action. It is as reasonable to assume the Court
wanted a trial court to consider the liability issue. 
3
B. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields "government officials
performing discretionary functions"' from civil damages as long as their
actions did not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."s This doctrine
recognizes that there are "special policy concerns involved in suing
government officials,"" including the harm to government efficiency
80. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions' generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Court's landmark Harlow decision endorsed
"[r]eliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct" over a subjective test for
"malicious intention" in weighing when a state actor may assert qualified immunity so as to
further the interests of governmental and judicial efficiency. Id.
81. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615.
82. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Berger, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999).
83. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (noting "it is for the District
Court to determine whether.., defendants actually acted 'under color of state law"' for
purposes of § 1983 liability).
84. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
85. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982). The Supreme Court's approach to immunity
(absolute v. qualified) for a government actor depends on "the function performed by that
official in a particular context." Karen M. Blum, Section 1983: Qualified Immunity, in 14TH
ANN. SEC. 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG., at 407, 410 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. HO-002B, 1998) available at Westlaw at 595 PLI/Lit 407. Generally,
only officials carrying out judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions have been given
absolute immunity. Id.
86. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813). "In short,
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caused by "lengthy judicial inquiry into subjective motivation." '
The Court has refined its qualified immunity analysis in several cases
over the years.' The overall immunity analysis starts by allocating
immunity-whether absolute or qualified-according to the official's
function in a given circumstance.9 Judges and lawmakers, for example,
have absolute immunity anytime they act in their official capacities."
Other government actors, including law enforcement officers, can be
immune from civil damages when performing their duties under certain
circumstances. 9'
The immunity issue, of course, only arises if it is determined that a §
1983' or Bivens93 suit alleges an actual constitutional violation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court reiterated in Wilson that "clearly
the qualified immunity recognized in Harlow acts to safeguard government, and thereby to
protect the public at large, not to benefit its agents." Id. at 167-68.
87. Id. at 165 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18). The Court's policy considerations seem
to fall into three categories: the unfairness of holding public officials personally liable for all
constitutional violations "given the sometimes unclear nature of constitutional law;" the
chilling effect on officials fearful of being sued at every turn; and the costs to the officials and
government even if a trial "ultimately finds that the officials are not liable." Alan K. Chen,
The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1997).
88. The Supreme Court began articulating the immunity defense upon determining that
§ 1983 "incorporat[ed] common law immunities that were in place in 1871, the time of Section
1983's original passage." Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo.
L. REV. 123, 126 (1999). Congress drafted what would become 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the wake
of "violence against newly freed slaves and the inability or unwillingness of state officials to
control the lawlessness." Id. at 125.
89. Blum, supra note 85, at 410.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. It states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. I11996).
93. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). The Court held that a plaintiff who can prove damages from "the violation by federal
agents of his Fourth Amendment rights" may seek recovery in federal court. Id. at 397.
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established" means the right must be so apparent "a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 94 The Court
added that because the right must be "defined at the appropriate level
of specificity,"'95 the officers in Wilson could assert qualified immunity
because media ride-alongs were common in 1992 and no court had held
the practice to be unlawful when it continued into a home.96 Therefore,
the right was not "clearly established" at the time of the raid because a
reasonable officer could have assumed it was appropriate to invite the
media to the Wilsons' home.'
Complicating the issue of qualified immunity is the question of when
it may apply to private actors. Although private actors may be sued in
some circumstances 98 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens, the Court has
indicated the rationale for qualified immunity does not easily apply to
private parties."
Faced with the specific question of whether qualified immunity
extends to private actors facing § 1983 liability "for invoking a state
replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute" the Court ruled in Wyatt
v. Cole that it does not.'° Yet in deciding the case, the Court also said
the traditional public policy rationales for extending qualified immunity
to state actors "are not applicable to private parties."' 0' The Wyatt court
further noted that despite "principles of equality and fairness" which
might suggest extending qualified immunity to private actors, such
interests do not justify any expansion."
94. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The joint action doctrine asserts that private actors can be deemed government
actors if they are "willful" participants in some government action. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129
F.3d 505, 514 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district
court's decision in part, reversing in part, and remanding in part, due to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)). The Ninth Circuit noted the joint action
test is met "when the plaintiff is able to establish an agreement, or conspiracy between a
government actor and a private party." Id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
99. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (rejecting qualified immunity for
guards at private prison with state contract); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992) (refusing
to extend qualified immunity to private defendants sued for securing relief under a replevin
statute later determined to be unconstitutional).
100. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168-69.
101. Id. at 167. The Wyatt court noted since "private parties hold no office requiring
them to exercise discretion; nor are they principally concerned with enhancing the public
good," the public interest would not be harmed by denying them qualified immunity. Id.
102. Id.
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This language seems to have led some lower courts to conclude that
qualified immunity may never extend to private actors facing § 1983
suits.03 For example, in its revised opinion in Berger, the Ninth Circuit
cited Wyatt-but provided no discussion-to assert that the "media
defendants.., are not entitled to assert qualified immunity as a
defense. "'0' It cited an earlier Ninth Circuit case that had characterized
Wyatt as "concluding that private actors are not entitled to the absolute
immunity it granted to some government officials" and those "'who
conspire with state officials to violate constitutional rights' are not
entitled to the good faith immunity, also known as qualified immunity,
available to other public officials."'05
Meanwhile, other commentators have found in Wyatt an implicit
concern that extending qualified immunity to private parties would
serve merely commercial, rather than public, interests." Yet there
seems to be a valid question as to whether the media should be viewed
as serving only its own commercial interests, rather than the public
good. Any newspaper or broadcast outlet obviously has an interest in
commercial viability, but it should not be assumed that the media's
public-service function is somehow less important. As Paul McMasters,
First Amendment ombudsman for the Freedom Forum in Arlington,
Virginia, noted recently, "You can't be a good citizen, a good voter, a
good taxpayer without knowing how your government operates. "'
7
C. "Good Faith" Defense?
The Supreme Court has twice declined to address the question of
whether private actors lacking immunity to federal civil rights suits may
still assert an affirmative "good faith" defense."8 Although a pre-Wyatt
decision from the Eleventh Circuit in 1988 cited the "existence of a good
103. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 404 (noting the Sixth Circuit "conceded that other
courts had reached varying conclusions about whether, or the extent to which, private sector
defendants are entitled to immunities of the sort the law provides governmental defendants').
104. Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1156, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999).
105. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no immunity at common
law to shield private attorneys in federal civil rights action) (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168-
69).
106. Robert G. Schaffer, Note, The Public Interest in Private Party Immunity: Extending
Qualified Immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Private Prisons, 45 DUKE L. J. 1049, 1051-52
(1996) (arguing that qualified immunity should be extended to employees of private prisons).
107. Annysa Johnson, Police Departments Withhold Reports, Citing Privacy Ruling,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 2000, at B1.
108. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 169 (1992); Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413.
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faith... defense in common law"'1 9 to apply the qualified immunity
doctrine to private defendants, noting "it would be unfair to treat
private parties as state actors but deny them the same immunity granted
to public officials,"11° the Wyatt court rejected such reasoning."' It
instead reiterated that it had "established an 'immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability,"'1 " seemingly preserving the two as
separate concepts.
Since Wyatt, circuit courts of appeals have recognized that the
Supreme Court "expressly left open the question of whether private
parties acting under color of law could raise" a good-faith"3 defense to a
Bivens suit.114 The Third Circuit concluded in 1994 that "'good faith'
gives state actors a defense that depends on their subjective state of
mind, rather than the more demanding objective standard of reasonable
belief that governs qualified immunity. 15
The Supreme Court itself noted in the 1997 case Richardson v.
McKnight"6 that Wyatt was a limited decision, not applicable to all
private parties no matter their relationship to the government.Y7 The
Court also said Richardson was a narrow decision, "[w]e have answered
the immunity question narrowly, in the context in which it arose" and
that it had not decided whether the private defendants could assert a
good-faith defense.""'
This seems to leave the door open for CNN to assert a good-faith
defense to the Bergers' claim and prove its subjective lack of malice in
covering the Montana ranch raid. It simply does not seem logical to
109. Schaffer, supra note 106, at 1065 (quoting Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321
(11th Cir. 1988)(en banc). But see Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167 (noting the Court recognized
qualified immunity "based not simply on the existence of a good faith defense at common
law, but on the special policy concerns involved in suing government officials").
110. Schaffer, supra note 106, at 1065. The author adds, "Such a result, the court stated,
would render private defendants 'more liable' than public defendants." Id.
111. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent notes early ambiguity over
whether good faith was a defense or an immunity. Id. at 176-77.
112. Id. at 166 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
113. A good-faith defense has been characterized as traditionally requiring a showing
that a defendant either "acted without malice or... acted with probable cause." Id. at 177
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
114. Blum, supra note 85, at 418 (quoting Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard
Attorneys, 76 F.3d 692, 699 (6th Cir. 1996) and citing Jordan v. Fox, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir.
1994)).
115. Id. (quoting Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1276).
116. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
117. Id. at 404.
118. Id. at 413-14
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ignore the media's duty to report on matters of "public or general
interest.""9
Of course, even such duty to the public will not afford CNN a good-
faith defense to the Bergers' "state law claims for trespass and
intentional infliction of emotional distress."'O The interests of
newsgathering clearly do not excuse unlawful media behavior,
121
including trespass or an intrusion that violates an individual's reasonable
expectations of privacy.1 2 "The press is limited by the laws that limit
everyone else," Privacy Journal editor Robert Ellis Smith told the
Christian Science Monitor in the wake of Wilson, adding "The press has
no special standing to violate laws."'2'
But even if CNN could successfully assert a good-faith defense
regarding the constitutional issue in this case, the precedent would be of
limited use to the Fourth Estate: The Court's bright-line ride-along rule
means any such precedent logically could apply only to acts committed
prior to the Wilson v. Layne'24 and Hanlon v. Berger" decisions, since
the police and media are now on notice that such ride-alongs violate the
Fourth Amendment. It seems unlikely that any future media
organization could assert even a subjectively based good-faith defense
when the Supreme Court has spoken so clearly.
Those in the media should be more concerned with their less clearly
defined chances of being labeled, Berger-style, as government actors
because of their approach to newsgathering. Since the Supreme Court
did not address cases in which the media is invited to witness law
enforcement activities outside of private homes, it seems certain that the
issue will be raised by future litigation. In fact, a recent Second Circuit
case 126 holding that police violated a criminal suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights by arranging a "perp walk"' 27 for the media noted
119. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
120. Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155,1157 (9th Cir. 1999).
121. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,248-50 (9th Cir. 1971).
122. See discussion supra Part II.A. and infra Part V.C.
123. Warren Richey, When Cops Bust In, News Crews in Tow, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, March 24, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 537800.
124. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
125. 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
126. Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). As in Wilson, the court granted
qualified immunity to police because the Fourth Amendment violation was not clearly
established at the time of the incident. Id. at 216.
127. A so-called perp walk "is a widespread police practice... in which the suspected
perpetrator of a crime, after being arrested, is 'walked' in front of the press so that he can be
photographed or filmed." Id. at 203.
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the court did not touch on the news organization's liability because the
television station "was never a party to this lawsuit."2 Before Berger, it
seemed doubtful a court would have felt compelled to even mention the
issue.
Resolution of the Bergers' case against CNN thus will provide clues
to the next pendulum swing in the effort to balance society's dual
interests in privacy and a free press.
IV. BERGER V. CNN
A. Setting the Scene
Paul and Erma Berger sued both federal agents and a news
organization in the wake of a 1993 raid on their 75,000-acre Montana
ranch.9 The United States Fish and Wildlife Service, acting on
complaints from former Berger employees that the ranchers had
poisoned or shot eagles, obtained a warrant to search the spread
(including the Bergers' home).' 3 Although the Bergers did not know it,
the agent leading the search wore a microphone and the video cameras
being used belonged to CNN.
131
The Bergers found out later that CNN and TBS had learned of the
upcoming search and struck a deal with federal agents to ride-along on
the raid to obtain footage for an environmental program.132  CNN
drafted a letter promising not to air video footage of the raid unless the
government opted not to press charges against the Bergers, a jury had
been seated in any resulting trial, or the case had been otherwise
resolved.33
The Ninth Circuit later ruled that the federal agents had violated the
Bergers' constitutional rights and could not assert qualified immunity to
avoid paying damages.'3 Although the United States Supreme Court
128. Id. at 213-214.
129. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's decision in part, reversing in part, and remanding in
part, due to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 509.
132. Id. at 508.
133. Id. (reprinting the letter word-for-word). At trial, Paul Berger was acquitted of
federal charges of violating laws protecting eagles and found guilty of misdemeanor use of a
pesticide. Associated Press, CNN Trial Ordered in Ranch Raid, 359 HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug.
30, 1999, available at 1999 WL 22806877.
134. Berger, 129 F.3d at 510.
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agreed that the agents had violated the Bergers' Fourth Amendment
rights by allowing the media ride-along, it found that qualified immunity
did apply.'35 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit initially withdrew its 1997
decision before amending the order to affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the officers.' 3'
But the Bergers' lawsuit against CNN was ordered to trial.37
Although the district court originally dismissed the Bergers' claims
against the news organization, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit
found that CNN and TBS were not entitled to summary judgment
because they "participated as 'joint actors' with the federal officers."'"
In their mop-up decision the appellate judges took care to note, "[t]he
media defendants have not asserted and are not entitled to assert
qualified immunity as a defense." '139 The question that will eventually
face a jury is the extent of the media's liability to the Bergers for what
the Ninth Circuit labeled as state action.
B. Joint Action
1. Applied in non-media cases
The question of whether reporters become state actors in gathering
news with the cooperation of police officers may be a relatively recent
one. But the courts have had many opportunities to consider what
constitutes state action by a private party in other situations."
For example, the Court clarified in 1980 that § 1983's liability for
those acting under the color of state law is not'limited to officers of the
state.141 The Court held it is "enough that [a defendant] is a willful
participant in joint action with the State or its agents." '42 Thus "[p]rivate
135. See discussion of reasoning in companion Wilson case, supra Part III.
136. Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999).
137. As of fall 2000, the case was still pending in federal district court in Billings,
Montana.
138. Id. at 1157.
139. Id. (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992).
140. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding a private nursing home was not
a state actor despite state regulation and support); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (declining to label a private school as a state actor despite state contract and funding);
United States v. Kennedy, 81 F.Supp. 2d. 1103 (D. Kan. 2000) (finding an Internet service
provider was not a state actor when it searched files of a client and notified police of images
of child pornography).
141. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,27 (1980) (finding that private parties who conspired
with a judge acted under color of state law).
142. Id.
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persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action" are
liable under § 1983.' 43
Moreover, in 1982's landmark Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.'
44
the Supreme Court decided a corporate creditor who merely sought and
received pre-judgment attachment of a debtor's property had acted
under color of state law and so could face a § 1983 suit.1'5 The Court
reiterated that a party accused of conduct violating a federal right "must
be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.., because he is a
state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the State.' 46  Interestingly, Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor joined in Justice Powell's dissent, which called the majority's
decision "a disquieting example of how expansive judicial decision-
making can ensnare a person who had every reason to believe he was
acting in strict accordance with law. "'
More recently, the Eleventh Circuit held that a therapist involved in
a child sexual abuse investigation had not become a state actor under §
1983.148 The court found that the private therapist, hired by the
children's mother, had no formal role in the police investigation despite
being present while officers interviewed the children.'49 The Eleventh
Circuit also declined to extend the state actor label to the husband of an
involuntarily committed woman, his attorney, her private doctor, or a
private hospital.' ° The court found that none of the parties' conduct in
committing the woman satisfied any of the tests for "establishing state
action by what is otherwise a private person or entity: the public
143. Id. at 27-28.
144. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
145. After a hearing the attachment was dismissed because the creditor "failed to
establish the statutory grounds for attachment alleged in the petition." Id. at 925. The
debtor's subsequent § 1983 suit alleged a violation of the 14th Amendment in that the
creditor "acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of
law." Id. The Court found no distinction between conduct that satisfied the constitutional
requirement of state action and conduct which amounted to acting under color of state law
for statutory purposes. Id. at 934-35.
146. Id. at 937.
147. Id. at 944 (Powell, J., dissenting).
148. Lowe v. Aldridge, 958 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1992).
149. Id. at 1572-73. Interestingly, less than a month before the Supreme Court's Wyatt
decision blocked private actors from asserting qualified immunity, this court noted that even
if the therapist had acted under color of state law "she would be entitled to qualified
immunity along with [the police]" because the plaintiff had to prove such conduct "violated
clearly established constitutional law" and demonstrated "a lack of good faith." Id. at 1573.
150. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127 (1992).
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function test, the state compulsion test, and the nexus/joint action
test."51
The public function test is a limited one covering "only private
actors performing functions 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the State,' ,,152 while the state compulsion test requires the government to
have "coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged to
violate the Constitution." '153 The nexus/joint action test requires a
"symbiotic relationship [which] must involve the alleged constitutional
violation" 1" and be judged according to "the peculiar facts or
circumstances present."155
2. Applied in media cases
The courts also have previously considered whether various forms of
media conduct rose to the level of state action, but before Berger judges
tended to dismiss the suggestion. For example, in a 1979 Wisconsin case
a state appeals court rejected the notion that a reporter who
accompanied police investigating reports of shots being fired from a
doctor's home/office had acted under color of state law.
1 56
Although the reporter entered the building with police and filmed
officers seizing guns and interviewing the doctor,157 the court held that
the reporter "acted exclusively for his private employer""5 8 and the mere
filming and broadcast "without more" did not make an otherwise
reasonable search and seizure unreasonable. 9 Of course, the court's
permissive approach to a reporter riding along with police to a suspect's
home is no longer valid in the wake of Wilson v. Layne,' ° but its analysis
151. Id. at 1130.
152. NBC v. Communications Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1988) (finding that
a union's conduct in barring certain reporters from its convention at a publicly owned facility
did not rise to the level of state action) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
353 (1974)).
153. NBC, 860 F.2d at 1026.
154. Id. at 1027.
155. Id. at 1028 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725-26
(1961)). Other jurisdictions, such as the Ninth Circuit, view the nexus and joint action
evaluations as separate tests. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 514 (9th Cir. 1997),
withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's decision in part,
reversing in part, and remanding in part, due to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hanlon v.
Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)).
156. Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
157. Id. at 773.
158. Id. at 774.
159. Id.
160. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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of what does or does not constitute state action by the media remains
compelling in its emphasis on reasonableness.16' The court further noted
that the circumstances did not involve "intimate, offensive or vulgar
aspects" and the police raid itself was not confidential since it more
resembled "the charge on San Juan hill." 62
More recently, a Georgia federal district court decided that a
television crew had not acted under color of state law by filming inside a
prison for a segment called Living the Good Life.'6 The Eighth Circuit,
meanwhile, found no state action on the part of a television crew that
merely videotaped police raiding a home with a search warrant, T6 an
example of the type of ride-along now banned by Wilson v. Layne.'"
And the district court in Nichols v. Hendrix" found no joint action on
the part of multiple news organizations that covered a police raid,
factually distinguishing it from the Berger incident.
3. Applied in Berger
In its original Berger decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
question of whether acts of private parties rise to the level of state
action is a "highly factual inquiry. "'67 It outlined the four tests available
for such an inquiry, before opting for the so-called joint action test'
Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Dennis v. Sparks,'6' the
appellate panel said private parties can be considered government
actors if they willingly participate in joint action with the government or
its agents.'
The Ninth Circuit held that CNN had become a joint actor with the
federal agents (meaning the news organization acted "'under color' of
law for purposes of [Bivens] actions") 17' by virtue of the verbal and
161. Prahl, 295 N.W.2d at 774.
162. Id.
163. Mullins v. Bookman, No. 1:94-CV-1591-MHS, 1995 WL 693962, at *1 (N.D. Ga.
Apr. 26, 1995).
164. Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the media outlet and
police did not aid each other in their separate tasks).
165. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
166. No. CIV 2:98-CV-161-WCO, 1999 WL 727233, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 1999).
167. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 514 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's decision in part, reversing in part, and remanding in
part, due to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)).
168. Id.
169. 449 U.S. 24,27 (1980).
170. Berger, 129 F.3d at 514.
171. Id. (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28) (brackets in original).
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written agreements, sharing of confidential information, and the federal
agents' attention to enhancing the search's "entertainment, rather than
its law enforcement value." 172
Although CNN sought U.S. Supreme Court review of this aspect of
the Bergers' lawsuit, the Court declined." And after an en banc review
of the case, the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme Court had affirmed its
"holding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred in this
case." 74 CNN and media observers now await the expected trial that
will determine the media organization's liability under the joint actor
designation.
V. ASSESSING MEDIA LIABILITY
A. Distinguishing Berger
The Bergers' suit against CNN no doubt will be watched closely by
media outlets and other media observers. The idea that reporters may
be held personally liable for constitutional torts alleged to have occurred
in the traditional process of covering police and crime is likely to
concern print and broadcast journalists. (Ironically, the reality-based
entertainment shows are likely to keep rolling, given industry reaction
to the Wilson decision.)75 But perhaps the media would be wise to
avoid indulging in too much hand wringing just yet.
Even assuming that CNN's extraordinary cooperation with the
federal agents did rise to the level of state action, the long-term effect of
the Ninth Circuit's ruling remains murky. It seems unlikely that courts
across the country will be jumping at the chance to label news
organizations as having acted under color of state law-mostly because
CNN's extreme level of involvement is rare in the world of real
joumalism.'76
It illustrates the danger poised by news organizations eager to be
172. Id. at 515.
173. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Berger, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999).
174. Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999).
175. See Matt Zoller Seitz, Court Issues Police 'Reality' Check, STAR LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), May 26,1999, at 39. Cops creator John Langley issued a statement predicting "business
as usual," despite warnings from legal scholars that it would be wise for such shows to stay off
private property, even if they plan to obtain releases of anyone filmed. Id.
176. See Ann Woolner, Media Getting Too Cozy with Law Enforcement, USA TODAY,
Mar. 24, 1999, at 25A. "Some of the conduct of CNN and the feds is disturbing, indeed, as
neither seemed to consider the effect this joint effort would have on the Bergers. In addition,
they worked too closely to do their jobs as independently as they should have." Id.
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first with a report and willing to do whatever that goal requires.' Yet,
that is not the outlook of all journalists. It is much more common for a
news organization to join police on routine patrols of public streets than
to collaborate on raiding a private residence. 78
Thus, future courts considering whether media acts constitute public
acts, will be hard-pressed to cite Berger as precedent for making such
calls. Berger is far too fact-specific: Representatives of a news program
with a decidedly environmental spin urged police to strike a deal
allowing exclusive coverage of a raid in exchange for the news
organization's promise to delay publication essentially until authorities
signal approval. 79  As part of the act, federal agents don hidden
microphones and take pains to draw soundbite-worthy conversation
from suspects.'80
News coverage, even of police activities, simply does not occur in
such a manner on a regular basis. Even the U.S. attorney in Montana at
the time of the Berger raid later noted she had tried to keep her
assistant, who signed the deal with CNN, from carrying out the plan
because she feared it would violate the Berger's privacy. '81 The newly
retired official saw a difference between media ride-alongs that result in
"showing the public a cocaine operation and 'a rancher who had eagles
bothering his sheep.""" This view reflects a level of reasonableness that
balances societal interests with privacy concerns; it is one that should
factor more prominently in the conduct of the media, police, and courts.
For example, a court deciding whether a media organization was a
joint actor in law enforcement activity should realize that the Dennis'13
standard of willful participation in a conspiracy with state officials will
rarely be met. As even the Ninth Circuit noted in distinguishing Berger
from cases that found no joint action between the media and police for
177. "As the Berger case reveals, it is all too tempting for a competitive press to sacrifice
its long-run interests in independence in order to achieve short-run advantages." Randall P.
Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between Exemption and
Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L. J. 895, 913 (1998).
178. This is most likely due to the "guarded nature" of the police, which requires
reporters on the police beat to develop "inside sources." MELVIN MENCHER, NEWS
REPORTING AND WRITING 435 (7th ed. 1997).
179. See supra Part IV.A.
180. See id.
181. Jonathan Ringel, A New Wrinkle in CNN Case; Days Before High Court
Showdown, Former U.S. Attorney Speaks Out, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, March 19,
1999.
182. Id.
183. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).
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purposes of civil rights liability, the "highly factual inquiry ' ' 4 required
for such a determination also must include an examination of the state's
conduct.1" In other words, it can be argued that merely bringing news
crews along during a raid on a public business or clinic reasonably is not
enough to trigger joint action,1" but recreating a suspect's arrival at a
police station for the media's benefit reasonably is enough."'
Reporters and police officers likewise should consider what the
public would label as reasonable' in the pursuit of newsgathering that
furthers the societal aim of watching over the state. Avoiding Berger-
style agreements, for example, is an obvious initial goal.
B. Beyond Wilson
Because the Supreme Court said nothing specifically about the
media continuing to ride along during routine police shifts or gathering
news in public places such as streets, the media certainly will not be
completely frozen out of covering police and crime news by the home
ride-along banY9
There may be a chilling effect, however, on newsgathering,
especially when coupled with "lawsuits that target surreptitious news-
184. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 514 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's decision in part, reversing in part, and remanding in
part, due to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)).
185. Id. at 515-16 (finding "nothing passive about the government's involvement with
the media in this case").
186. See Swate v. Taylor, 12 F.Supp. 2d 591, 596-97 (S.D. Texas 1998) (holding a federal
drug enforcement officer infringed the Constitution by "giving news crews access" to four
methadone clinics during records searches); Ohio v. Covey, No. L-98-1173, 2000 WL 638951
(Ohio App. 2000) (finding no constitutional violation when a humane society allowed media
coverage of a raid on a business but did not specifically invite reporters along).
187. See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding the "staged
recreation" "lacked any legitimate enforcement purpose, and hence was unreasonable").
188. University of Virginia Law Professor Robert M. O'Neil argues that although the
question of whether media cameras invade privacy should continue to turn on the reasonable
expectation of privacy in a given place, "rapidly changing technology and novel means of
gathering information" are blurring the distinction. Robert M. O'Neil, Ride-Alongs,
Paparazz4 and Other Media Threats to Privacy, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 1167, 1183 (2000).
189. The lawyer who represented the police officers in both Wilson and Berger believes
the Court meant to indicate the media could observe police activities "as long as journalists
stay outside when officers enter private homes." Laurie Asseo, Court Bars Press Entry in
Homes with Police, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 25, 1999, at A12. See also Deleith Duke
Gossett, Constitutional Law and Criminal Procedure-Media Ride-Alongs into the Home:
Can They Survive a Head-on Collision Between First and Fourth Amendment rights? Wilson v.
Layne, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 679,708 (2000) (noting the media "may still trail
officers on the street and from the curb, and obtain footage there, if the law enforcement
officers wish to continue the practice").
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gathering techniques, even when the story has a compelling public
interest."'' 0 Police, for example, may become wary of reporters being
present at any law enforcement activity. The result could be a reduced
"watchdog" role for the press, meaning reporters will have less access to
"monitor abuse of government power 'by observing and recording first
hand the activities of government officials charged with enforcing the
law.' 191
Coupled with the wariness which courts have recently exhibited in
approaching media cases,"9 Wilson may prove to curb more media
conduct than even the Supreme Court intended.'93
C. Under Tort Law
The media's liability for torts committed in the process of
newsgathering is unlikely to be affected by Wilson and Berger. There
simply is no absolute privilege for newsgathering. 94  And as the
Supreme Court noted in 1991, "enforcement of such general laws
against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied
to enforcement against other persons or organizations."'9'
Newsgathering tort cases in recent years have alleged trespass, fraud,
misrepresentation, theft, conversion, and assault and battery, as well as
invasion of privacy, intrusion, and harassment.'96 Such actions have been
found not to infringe the First Amendment because they allege a harm
190. Paul Brownfield, Reality-Based TV Raises Questions About Privacy, L.A. TIMES,
reprinted in BUFFALO NEwS, June 28, 1998, at TV2. The news story quotes New York
University journalism professor and lawyer Steve Solomon as noting, "One of the most active
areas in litigation right now is on news-gathering tactics of the press .... It's sort of a growth
industry for lawyers." Id.
191. Rebecca Porter, Media 'Ride-Alongs' Violate the Constitution, Supreme Court
Rules, TRIAL, July 1999 at 120 (quoting the amicus curiae brief filed in Wilson on behalf of
news organizations). The attorney who filed the brief predicted Wilson would have "an
unfortunate effect on news reporting." Id.
192. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for
Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143 (2000) (noting "[t]he
Supreme Court's low esteem for the press, which is shared by judges at all levels").
193. 526 U.S. 603, 613 (1999) (noting "[n]o one could gainsay.., the importance of the
First Amendment in protecting press freedom from abridgment by the government").
194. See PEMBER, supra note 48, at 365 (discussing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) (finding no privilege protecting reporters from being forced to reveal confidential
sources to a grand jury)).
195. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
196. Roy S. Gutterman, Chilled Bananas: Why Newsgathering Demands More First
Amendment Protection, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 197,220-21 (2000).
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from the newsgathering itself, not the publication of news.'9
Thus, reporters and photographers need to continue to be aware of
crossing the line from legal to illegal acts in the gathering of news. Of
course, the line may be easy to spot when the media contemplates, for
example, entering someone's back yard. But it may be more difficult to
determine what is reasonable under state tort laws when reporters are
gathering news at a place of business.
For example, the California Supreme Court recently ruled that
ABC's Prime Time Live violated the privacy of a psychic hotline
employee by using a hidden camera to record conversations in the
workplace. 98 The opinion found that the reasonable expectation of
privacy in a place of employment depends on the "identity of the
claimed intruder and the means of intrusion."" Thus, despite no
reasonable expectation of complete privacy in workplace conversations,
ABC stepped over the line.f°
VI. CONCLUSION
Even the Supreme Court admits there may be a level of legitimate
government interest inherent in encouraging certain forms of media
ride-alongs. 21 Thus the tension between an individual's right to privacy
and the public's right to know cannot be resolved in the arena of police
coverage by means of a ban on all ride-alongs. Existing working
relationships between reporters and police should continue to the extent
that the Fourth Amendment concerns of Wilson are not implicated.
The media, meanwhile, should not panic over the prospect of being
declared an agent of the state anytime reporters seek to cover the
activity of law enforcement agencies. The facts of Berger v. CNN simply
are too narrow for widespread use of a Ninth Circuit-style application of
the joint actor test. And even in cases arising from incidents prior to
Wilson, media organizations such as CNN may properly and successfully
assert a good faith defense to a § 1983 or Bivens suit.
But overall, media organizations and reporters need to put
197. Id.
198. Employee's Privacy May Be Invaded By Television Reporter's Use of Hidden Video
Camera, California Supreme Court Rules in Case Triggered by ABC Broadcast of "PrimeTime
Live" Segment, Even Though Employee Could Not Have Expected Complete Privacy Because
Conversation with Reporter Could Have Been Overheard by Co-workers," 6 ENT. L. REP. 24
(Nov. 1999) (reporting on Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999)).
199. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 67.
200. See id.
201. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612-13 (1999).
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themselves in a reasonable person's shoes in considering what would be
an appropriate newsgathering technique. Such minimal self-restraint,
mimicking the statutory and judicial approach to privacy issues, is the
best way to guarantee a continued balance between society's dual
interests in protecting privacy and staying informed.
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